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Abstract 
How is social hierarchy in multinational corporations (MNCs) culturally produced, contested 
and reproduced? While the international business literature has acknowledged the importance 
of culture, it gives little concern to its role in constructing social hierarchies and symbolic 
boundaries between individuals and groups within MNCs. We take a Bourdieusian approach 
to understanding the role of cultural capital in structuring the social hierarchy in the MNC 
under two contrasting organizational architectures: hierarchical and network architecture. We 
argue that cultural capital serves as an instrument of power and status within the MNC, 
influencing access to valuable resources such as jobs, rewards, and opportunities. Our 
framework further suggests that the transition from hierarchical towards network architecture 
sets in motion a high-stakes political struggle between headquarters and subsidiary actors 
over the relative value of their cultural capital in a bid to preserve or gain dominance and to 
determine the ‘rules of the game’ that order the social hierarchy in the MNC. We elaborate on 
this political struggle by theorizing about the relative dominance of cultural versus social 
capital, the content and relative value of firm-specific and cosmopolitan cultural resources, 
and the convertibility of cultural capital into other forms of capital under hierarchical and 
network architectures.  
Keywords 
Bourdieu; cultural capital; MNC, multinational corporation; organizational architecture; 
social capital; social hierarchy  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 Culture and cultural processes figure prominently in international business (IB). 
However, research has been dominated by essentialist analyses that have objectified cultural 
characteristics and reified cultural differences (Vaara, Tienari and Säntti, 2003), focusing on 
the core dimensions of national cultures (i.e., cultural norms, values, and practices) and 
cultural distance between countries. Much less attention has been given to the role of culture 
in the construction and reproduction of power relations and symbolic boundaries between 
individuals and groups within the multinational corporation (MNC). Thus, while research has 
identified a host of cultural consequences, it has largely overlooked the questions of how 
cultural resources underlie the social hierarchy within the MNC and how these are used ‘both 
as weapons and as stakes’ in the struggle to gain ascendancy over the organization 
(Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008: 11, emphasis in original). 
 Social hierarchies are prevalent across a broad range of social organizations (Gould, 
2002), including complex and diverse organizations such as MNCs. They can be viewed as a 
mechanism—formal or informal—that ranks individuals and groups on the basis of socially 
valued dimensions (Magee and Galinsky, 2008) or various forms of capital (i.e., economic, 
social, cultural) (Bourdieu, 1986). Thus, individuals and groups are sorted into ‘social 
positions that carry unequal rewards, obligations, and expectations’ (Gould, 2002: 1143) 
based on their capital endowment. One of the most important forms of capital is cultural 
capital, defined as a corpus of cultural resources, including knowledge, dispositions, and 
objects that is valued within a particular field of social action (Bourdieu, 1986). Cultural 
capital is often used by dominant groups to construct status and power distinctions between 
individuals and groups and to legitimize their relative positions in the social hierarchy 
(Bourdieu, 1984). Cultural capital and the social hierarchy are therefore mutually 
 
 
 
 
constitutive, sorting individuals and groups into more or less advantageous positions in the 
social structure according to their capital endowments. However, IB research has focused 
almost exclusively on strategic and economic rationales, giving very little consideration to 
the underlying cultural logic and social meaning of these social positions and roles (Levy et 
al., 2015).  
  As MNCs go through major organizational transformations, the principles that order 
the social hierarchy and define what constitutes cultural capital or valuable cultural resources 
are in play. In fact, what may be at stake during these transformations is nothing less than the 
capacity to determine which contrasting forms of cultural capital will be most influential for 
gaining status and power in the MNC and for determining its activities and policies 
(Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Fligstein, 1990). In particular, as MNCs move away from 
hierarchical towards network organizational architecture (Hedlund, 1993; Menz, Kunisch and 
Collis, 2015), what may be at stake is which cultural resources—those held by headquarters 
(HQ) actors or those held by subsidiary actors—or, more broadly, whether cultural or social 
capital will emerge as relatively more dominant. However, mainstream research has failed to 
recognize these stakes and mostly ignored the role of culture and power in major 
organizational transformations, describing them largely in evolutionary terms rather than as 
sites of political conflicts (Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2014). Consequently, the political 
struggle among holders of different forms of capital in the bid to preserve or gain dominance 
has remained largely unexplored (Levy et al., 2015).  
 In this article, we seek to address these gaps in the literature by offering a theoretical 
framework that conceptualizes the role of cultural resources and political processes in 
structuring the social hierarchy in two contrasting organizational architectures of the MNC: 
hierarchical and network architecture. Drawing on the work of Bourdieu and colleagues 
 
 
 
 
(Bourdieu, 1984, 1986; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979, 1990), we suggest that cultural capital 
is used as an instrument of power and status within the MNC, enabling the dominant groups 
to monopolize privileges and exclude those deemed culturally inapt or culturally distant from 
high-status positions (Bourdieu, 1984). Thus, we argue that cultural capital underlies the 
social hierarchy in the MNC and influences access to valuable resources such as rewards and 
opportunities. Our analysis focuses primarily on cultural capital because we argue that it 
serves as an exceptionally dominant form of capital in the MNC under both hierarchical and 
network architectures. We do not directly consider economic capital because in those social 
fields where the dominant currency is cultural capital, financial and other tangible assets are 
largely a by-product of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1985). 
In our analysis, we focus on a particular processual element of political activity, that 
of politicization, which refers to challenges to established power structures (Palonen, 2003). 
Specifically, we suggest that the transformation from hierarchical architecture towards 
network architecture sets in motion a high-stakes political struggle between HQ and 
subsidiary actors over the principles that govern the recognition and legitimization of cultural 
resources, and order the social hierarchy in the MNC. Thus, the dominant form of cultural 
capital under hierarchical architecture may experience devaluation and lose its currency 
whereas other forms of cultural capital can emerge as influential under the network 
architecture of the MNC. We identify two forms of cultural capital—firm-specific and 
cosmopolitan—that may be subject to redefinition and revaluation as a result of the 
organizational transformation. Additionally, such transformation can potentially affect the 
salience of cultural capital relative to other forms of capital, particularly social capital, for 
ordering the social hierarchy within the MNC. Finally, we suggest that such transformation is 
likely to create a global political game where a larger number of actors, holding different 
 
 
 
 
forms of capital, jockey for social positions in the field of power (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 
2005). 
Through contrasting two prevalent and ideal-typical organizational architectures of 
the MNC, we make the following theoretical contributions. First, while the production and 
reproduction of social hierarchy has been widely studied from both psychological (e.g., Coté, 
2011) and sociological (e.g., Simpson, Willer and Ridgeway, 2012) approaches, it has 
received scant attention from organizational scholars in general and from the IB literature in 
particular. More specifically, existing work in IB tends to focus on the organizational level 
with little concern for how social hierarchy and power differences are generated at the inter- 
or intra-unit level within MNCs (Geppert, Becker-Ritterspach and Mudambi, 2016). We 
demonstrate how actors’ locale-specific embeddedness within the MNC determines the 
cultural resources they can leverage to attain a favourable position in the MNC’s social 
hierarchy, and how changes in structural configuration enable peripheral actors to ‘upgrade’ 
their capital endowments and compete for social status. In doing so, we explicitly link 
structural features, which continue to serve as a salient source of power differences in MNCs, 
with how actors actively shape existing power relations (Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2014; 
Geppert et al., 2016). We also challenge the conventional wisdom and propose that although 
the network MNC is often presented as ‘differentiated’ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Hedlund, 
1993; Menz et al., 2015) rather than stratified, it nevertheless gives rise to a social hierarchy 
based on different forms of capital. We theorize about the unintended consequences of the 
network MNC, suggesting that its supposedly dehierarchical and lateral nature leads, in fact, 
to the emergence of social hierarchy as a mechanism of control and coordination.  
Second, we adopt a political perspective to analyze the cultural processes that produce 
social hierarchy in MNCs. Although a growing literature examines the ways in which 
 
 
 
 
organizational life is culturally constructed (e.g., Weber and Dacin, 2011), the IB field is 
largely limited to objective-like manifestations of culture and essentialized cultural 
differences. Our theorizing suggests that culture is both a political resource and a constraint 
that stratifies power and status between employee groups in MNCs, and by extension affects 
the relative salience of social capital. Third, our framework has implications for the study of 
cultural capital. Specifically, we highlight the changing nature of the concept of cultural 
capital that is not limited to organizational and professional facets but also includes a 
cosmopolitan dimension (see also Prieur and Savage, 2013) as it increasingly operates in a 
transnational social space, is modified through structural changes, and potentially 
accumulated by a broader group of organizational actors than traditionally assumed.  
 In the following sections, we take a Bourdieusian approach to study the interrelations 
between cultural capital and social hierarchy in MNCs. We first discuss how cultural capital 
serves to produce and reproduce social hierarchy in the organization-as-a-field, and apply 
these ideas to structural configurations and particular actor groups in the MNC context. We 
then theorize about the role of cultural resources and political processes in structuring the 
social hierarchy as MNCs transition from hierarchical to network architecture. We conclude 
with a discussion and implications for theory, practice, and future research. 
 
The-organization-as-a-field and cultural capital   
Bourdieu defines the-organization-as-a-field as a network, or a configuration, of 
objective relations between positions anchored in certain forms of power or capital (Bourdieu 
and Wacquant, 1992). Thus, the concept of field denotes a force field where the distribution 
of capital establishes and reproduces a hierarchical set of power relations among positions 
and among the actors who occupy them (Swartz, 1997). The field can therefore be viewed as 
 
 
 
 
‘networks of social relations, structured systems of social positions within which struggles or 
manoeuvres take place over resources, stakes, and access’ (Oakes, Townley and Cooper, 
1998: 260). For Bourdieu (1986), each actor occupies a social position in the space of power 
due to the composition and volume of his or her capital endowment. In turn, this capital 
endowment enables the actor to operate effectively within the field and compete for resources 
and social positions (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008).  
Bourdieu (1986) distinguishes between three primary forms of capital that actors can 
possess—each assuming field-specific content and value (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). 
Economic capital refers to financial resources or assets that have a monetary value. Social 
capital is the sum of the actual and potential resources that can be mobilized through 
membership in social networks (Bourdieu, 1986). Cultural capital exists in various forms, 
including knowledge and expertise, formal credentials, as well as longstanding habitus, a 
system of behavioral and attitudinal dispositions acquired through the socialization process 
(Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008; Lamont and Lareau, 1988). Finally, Bourdieu (1986) 
introduces symbolic capital, commonly understood as prestige and honour accrued as a result 
of social recognition of the value of cultural, social, and/or economic capital. Thus, the notion 
of symbolic capital captures the ‘symbolic effects of capital’ when it is perceived and 
recognized as legitimate (Bourdieu, 2000: 242, emphasis in original; see also Kerr and 
Robinson, 2016).   
Our focus is on cultural capital and the role of cultural resources in structuring social 
hierarchies, power relations, and symbolic boundaries between individuals and groups 
(Lamont and Lareau, 1988; Robbins, 2005). According to Bourdieu (1984; Bourdieu and 
Passeron, 1979, 1990), the cultural resources of the dominant classes (i.e., upper class, upper-
middle and middle class), including cultural knowledge, tastes, preferences, attitudes and 
 
 
 
 
behaviors, become cultural capital, thereby serving as a class signal. As such, cultural capital 
helps to reproduce domination by marking cultural distance and proximity, monopolizing 
privileges, and excluding and recruiting new occupants for high-status positions (Lamont and 
Lareau, 1988). Furthermore, cultural capital can be used to gain access to scarce rewards and 
opportunities and is subject to monopolization and hoarding (Lareau and Weininger, 2003). 
Consequently, culture is viewed as key in the construction and reproduction of domination 
and hierarchy through the legitimization and appropriation of cultural knowledge (Lareau, 
2015). 
Research has focused on several cultural resources as valuable cultural capital in the 
workplace (e.g., Davies-Netzley, 1998; Friedman, Laurison and Miles, 2015; Kaplan, 2006; 
Kay and Hagan, 1998; Purcell, 2013; Rivera, 2012; Stuber, 2005). For example, Kay and 
Hagan (1998) found that cultural capital, manifested as a firm-specific disposition that is 
aligned with the culture or goals of the firm, significantly influenced the likelihood of women 
becoming partners in law firms. Purcell (2013) identified three forms of cultural capital—
knowledge about informal expectations in the workplace, ability to navigate a range of 
informal social events, and knowledge about popular culture—as valuable cultural resources 
in a large retail company. Rivera (2012) identified cultural similarities in taste, leisure 
pursuits, and self-presentation styles between potential employers and job candidates as 
cultural capital and suggested that these influenced hiring decisions. These studies suggest 
that cultural knowledge and resources are used to sort employees into organizational and 
social positions in the workplace and affect their rewards and opportunities.   
 
The multinational corporation architecture and cultural capital  
 
 
 
 
According to Bourdieu, there is a close correspondence between the structural 
configuration of the field and the form(s) of capital that are dominant within the field 
(Bourdieu, 1985). Conversely, the predominance of economic, social, or cultural capital is a 
characteristic of different fields of social action and results in different structural 
configurations (Anheier, Gerhards and Romo, 1995). For example, a predominance of 
cultural capital tends to lead to highly segmented and hierarchical social structures whereas a 
predominance of social capital leads to multiple though weakly institutionalized segments 
(Anheier et al., 1995). Therefore, ascertaining the nexus of field and capital involves a 
hermeneutic circle: ‘in order to construct the field, one must identify the forms of specific 
capital that operate within it, and to construct the forms of specific capital one must know the 
specific logic of the field’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 108). Determining the structural 
configuration of the MNC-as-a-field at a given point of time involves identifying three key 
elements: (a) the logic of the organizational architecture of the MNC; (b) the dominant actors 
or groups who are able to accumulate and deploy valuable capital within the MNC; and (c) 
the dominant form(s) of capital within the MNC underlying the power relations among actors 
(Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). Below, we discuss each of these elements. 
We primarily consider cultural capital because we view it as the operative, yet largely 
ignored, form of capital in the MNC, exerting significant influence on the social hierarchy in 
both hierarchical and network architectures. As such, it ‘determines the aggregate chances of 
profit in all games…, thereby helping to determine positions in the social space’ (Bourdieu, 
1985: 724). Further, economic capital involves weaker segmentation of the social structure 
and more fluid hierarchy relative to the other forms of capital and can be conceived as an 
outcome of the other forms of capital (Anheier et al., 1995).  
From hierarchy to network architecture  
 
 
 
 
 The IB literature has commonly conceptualized two alternative logics of MNC 
architecture that continue to characterize contemporary MNCs (Bouquet, Barsoux and Levy, 
2015; Geppert et al., 2016), contrasting traditional hierarchical with more decentralized and 
less formalized network architectures (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Menz et al., 2015). 
The traditional hierarchical—or hub-and-spoke—model constitutes an organizational 
structure in which each foreign subsidiary is linked to and controlled by HQ, and most 
resources flow either directly or indirectly through HQ (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). In 
contrast, network architecture, which subsumes varied conceptualizations such as heterarchy 
(Hedlund, 1993), multi-focal firm (Prahalad and Doz, 1987), transnational (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989), metanational (Doz, Santos and Williamson, 2001), and federation 
(Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2007), is characterized by increasingly interdependent and 
informal mechanisms of coordination, control and resource mobilization. Research has 
discussed several dimensions along which these two ideal-typical architectures differ, 
including the distribution of authority, range of resource mobilization, and coordination and 
control mechanisms (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Hedlund, 
1993; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989). Table 1 outlines these differences. 
    ___________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
    ____________________________ 
Research on the transition from hierarchical architecture towards network architecture 
of the MNC often describes this process in evolutionary terms, prompting MNCs to align 
their structure and internationalization strategies with demands of the external environment 
(Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2014; Westney, 2009). Thus, from an evolutionary perspective 
the transition from hierarchal to network architecture is often presented as an adaptive 
 
 
 
 
response to environmental pressures where the adoption of a ‘superior’ organizational 
architecture is thought to secure survival.  However, initial evidence suggests that this shift is 
a contested political process (e.g., Whitford and Zirpoli, 2016) rather than a ‘natural’ stage in 
an evolutionary process or an inevitability propelled by the superiority of informal 
mechanisms of collaboration and control such as lateral decision-making and normative 
integration (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Hedlund, 1993). Nevertheless, the role of power in 
such transitions and the effect of such transitions on the configuration of power relations and 
status hierarchies in the MNC are rarely explicitly considered. Specifically, mainstream 
evolutionary approaches to the study of MNCs commonly consider bottom-up political action 
as dysfunctional and to be curbed by the HQ through normative integration (Geppert and 
Dörrenbächer, 2014). At the same time, the reliance on normative integration as a control 
mechanism in network MNCs allows for subsidiary autonomy, with authority emerging 
laterally, and hence encourages subsidiary actors to become politically active (Williams and 
Lee, 2011).  
Despite the relevance of culture for the production of social hierarchy following a 
shift in the logic(s) of the organizational architecture very little research has examined the 
role of cultural capital. In the following, we will theorize about how changes in the structural 
configuration of the MNC affect the definition of valuable cultural resources and the 
dominance of cultural versus social capital.  
 
Dominant actor groups 
Examining political conflict within the MNC context requires identifying the relevant 
actor groups that compete for social status (Becker-Ritterspach and Dörrenbächer, 2009) and 
struggle for recognition of their cultural resources (Levy et al., 2015). Here, we draw on 
 
 
 
 
previous conceptualizations to distinguish between actors associated with HQ and with 
subsidiaries (Clark and Geppert, 2011; Delmestri and Brumana, 2017; Ferner, Edwards and 
Tempel, 2012). The relative dominance of HQ vis-à-vis subsidiary actors is considered the 
most important organizing principle of MNC activities, as evidenced by the large body of 
literature on the topic (for recent analyses, see Andersson and Holm, 2010; Boussebaa and 
Morgan, 2014). We recognize that HQ and subsidiary actors may differ with regard to their 
relative individual sources of power. For example, individual actors may be endowed with 
differential hierarchical status, resource control and network centrality both within and 
beyond their own unit (Reiche, Harzing, and Kraimer, 2009) or dispose of different 
discursive resources (Whitford and Zirpoli, 2016). Similarly, individual MNC units may 
differ in their relative power according to their level of internal embeddedness—the linkages 
with other MNC units—as well as their level of external embeddedness with outside 
stakeholders in their local environment (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008). Still, the HQ-
subsidiary relationship continues to serve as the primary axis of power relations within 
MNCs (e.g., Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2014) and is therefore key in the recognition and 
legitimacy of cultural resources in the MNC. 
It is important to note, however, that although the HQ is often conceived as 
strategically omniscient, agency is not limited to HQ actors (Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 
2014; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005). For example, previous research has highlighted that 
subsidiary managers can enhance their power base relative to HQ actors through the control 
of R&D resources (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004), control of the subsidiary’s local business 
network (Andersson et al., 2007), issue-selling (Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2016), 
initiative taking and profile building (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008), and interpersonal and 
cross-boundary networking (Williams and Lee, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
Given the HQ’s greater power over resources, processes and meaning compared to 
subsidiaries, both in terms of the number of issues for which HQ actors can determine 
outcomes and the number of contexts for which these dominance effects apply (Lukes, 2005; 
Ferner et al., 2012), a shift from hierarchical to network architecture may not result in a 
fundamental redistribution of capital endowments from HQ to subsidiary actors. 
Nevertheless, such transformation could have a significant effect because it destabilizes the 
field of power of the MNC and sets off a fierce competition for social positions where 
subsidiary actors are no longer mere spectators but rather serious contenders. Furthermore, 
the boundaries of the HQ organization as the main site for political struggle may become 
more fluid and permeable. Hence, we expect the structure of power relations within the MNC 
and the relative dominance of HQ actors to shift as a result of the transformation of the 
organizational architecture and the ensuing changes in relative value and salience of different 
forms of capital.   
 
Form(s) of cultural capital in the multinational corporation  
Cultural capital in the MNC reflects the values, normative standards, and expectations 
of the dominant groups in the organization; these are used to define both the embodied and 
institutionalized states of cultural capital within the firm. Embodied cultural capital reflects 
the legitimate cultural attitudes, preferences, and behaviors (or practices) that are acquired 
and internalized through socialization processes. Institutionalized cultural capital refers to 
formal or certified credentials such as educational degrees and diplomas, as well as expertise 
and skills; these are used to underpin the value of embodied cultural capital.1 Cultural capital, 
especially in its embodied state, often goes unrecognized as capital because its transmission 
and acquisition are more disguised than those of economic capital; it therefore functions as 
 
 
 
 
symbolic capital, i.e., recognized as a legitimate competence (Bourdieu, 1986). Our focus is 
on two primary forms of cultural capital that may operate within the MNC: firm-specific 
cultural capital and cosmopolitan cultural capital.  
Firm-specific cultural capital is internal and specific to a particular MNC; it 
represents those cultural resources that are operative within the organization-as-a-field and 
enable actors to function effectively within the MNC. These resources are developed and 
accumulated within a specific firm and are particularly valued in this context. Thus, firm-
specific cultural capital represents cultural proficiency in the tacit normative and cognitive 
‘rules of the game’ (Clegg, 1989) that govern the way things are done in the MNC; these 
rules also define the right or desirable dispositions, attitudes, and behaviors for employees 
working in the MNC. Employees who are proficient in the firm’s cultural norms, meanings, 
and rituals and can play the part are judged to be bona fide members of the organization. 
They are therefore more likely to gain access to rewards and opportunities within the MNC. 
Accordingly, this aspect of firm-specific cultural capital creates distinctions between 
employees on the basis of their cultural dispositions and proficiencies as organizational 
members, resulting in inclusion and exclusion of employees from rewards and opportunities 
(Lamont and Lareau, 1988; Lareau and Weininger, 2003). 
Firm-specific cultural capital can also involve proficiency in a professional corpus of 
knowledge and expertise that is valued within the MNC. While many MNCs ostensibly 
subscribe to the ideal that there are universal standards for judging professional performance 
and knowledge, in reality these evaluation criteria are often set by the dominant groups in the 
firm. They reflect a distinct interpretation of what it means to be a professional in a particular 
firm rather than a more general professional orientation (e.g., Kay and Hagan, 1998), or 
universal professional standards. Further, they also involve the often unspoken rules 
 
 
 
 
concerning how knowledge and expertise are judged and evaluated within the firm. Thus, 
cultural capital also creates distinctions between employees on the basis of their professional 
expertise, knowledge and credentials as judged by the powers that be; employees who 
demonstrate cultural proficiency and are thought to be the right kind of professional (Kay and 
Hagan, 1998) receive greater rewards. 
Finally, firm-specific cultural capital is often influenced by the home country of the 
MNC. Thus, elements of ‘national’ cultural capital—cultural resources that are valued in the 
home country of the MNC and are often accumulated through the home country educational 
system—are frequently incorporated into firm-specific cultural capital. For example, a recent 
survey of French multinationals indicated that these organizations continue to be dominated 
by a network of graduates of the elite grandes écoles and that proficiency in French was 
essential to reaching the boardroom (The Economist, 2015). Thus, while the MNC is 
considered a semi-autonomous field that produces and legitimizes its own cultural resources, 
some of these cultural resources are often derived from the national level and mirror the 
values and norms of the home country.   
While firm-specific cultural capital reflects a particular amalgamation of values, 
standards, and expectations, cosmopolitan cultural capital is not defined within the confines 
of a particular firm and is thus considered both external and more universal. Cosmopolitan 
cultural capital (also called global cultural capital) can be viewed as bodily and mental 
predispositions and competencies that facilitate skilful and confident engagement in 
transnational activities (Weenink, 2008: 1092). It also involves a discernible set of practices 
and experiences such as international work experience, international education (often in elite 
schools), and international mobility (Bühlmann and Mach, 2013; Igarashi and Saito, 2014; 
Kim, 2011; Levy, Peiperl and Jonsen, 2016). A person who possesses cosmopolitan cultural 
 
 
 
 
capital or claims to be a cosmopolitan can thus display knowledge, taste, and lifestyle that 
‘stand outside one’s own national frame of reference’ (Prieur and Savage, 2013: 259); he or 
she is often familiar with products and people from diverse cultures and feel at ease when 
operating across national borders. In many MNCs, this form of knowledge and expertise has 
acquired the characteristics of cultural capital because of its almost universal legitimacy, 
desirability, and unequal access (Igarashi and Saito, 2014). As such, it is often used to 
construct symbolic boundaries between employee groups through defining cosmopolitan 
knowledge and experience as valuable and delegitimizing other cultural resources by 
labelling them local, parochial, or outdated (Bourgouin, 2012; Lamont and Molnár, 2002). 
 
Cultural capital and the production of social hierarchy under changing MNC 
architectures 
In this section, we theorize about the role of cultural resources and political processes 
in structuring the social hierarchy in the MNC. To focus our theoretical analysis, we contrast 
two prevalent and ideal-typical organizational architectures of the MNC: hierarchical and 
network architecture (e.g., Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Bouquet et al., 2015; Geppert et 
al., 2016; Menz et al., 2015). Furthermore, we analyse the transition from hierarchical to 
network architecture as an iconic organizational transformation that demonstrates the political 
processes through which the social hierarchy in the MNC is produced, contested, and 
reproduced. Specifically, we contend that the transition from hierarchical to network 
architecture is highly political and contested because it affects the relative status of HQ and 
subsidiary actors and alters the value of their capital endowments. Our argument is threefold. 
First, cultural capital is the dominant form of capital in hierarchical architecture, which is 
typical of highly segmented and hierarchical social structures (Anheier et al., 1995; Bourdieu, 
 
 
 
 
1984). In network architecture social capital across the MNC is considered the most valuable 
currency. Thus, the transition from hierarchical to network architecture can potentially 
destabilize the social hierarchy and the relative value of cultural versus social capital, 
although we would argue that cultural capital retains a decisive influence on the social 
hierarchy even in a network MNC. 
Second, the structural transformation from hierarchical to network architecture is 
likely to affect the definition of valuable cultural resources or which of the various forms of 
cultural capital extant within the MNC will be the most influential in defining the activities 
and boundaries of the firm (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008).  Therefore, the competition for 
domination over the changing field often manifests itself as a struggle over which form(s) of 
cultural capital will generate power, authority, and symbolic profit.  Specifically, the relative 
value of the dominant cultural resources can diminish or undergo devaluation while the value 
of cultural resources previously undervalued can increase or become legitimized.  Further, the 
new context can create a heightened demand to a particular set of cultural resources and, as a 
result, these resources can undergo overvaluation, generating higher-than-normal returns and 
symbolic profits. Hence, those who hold dominant forms of capital are likely to enact 
conservation strategies in order to preserve the supremacy of their brand of capital and to 
defend or even enhance their position within the social hierarchy. In contrast, those who hold 
undervalued or non-dominant forms of capital are likely to enact subversion strategies in 
order to transform the prevailing system of power relations and authority within the field to 
their own benefit (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). Thus, the worth of cultural resources is at 
stake during the transformation, prompting actors to engage in a struggle over their valuation 
and legitimization. 
 
 
 
 
Third, cultural capital plays a dual role in the transformation from hierarchical to 
network architecture. On the one hand, cultural capital operates as stakes in the field because 
the transformation is likely to affect which cultural resources—those held by HQ actors or 
those held by subsidiary actors—or, more broadly, whether cultural or social capital will 
emerge as relatively more dominant in the MNC-as-a-field. On the other hand, cultural 
capital may be used as a weapon in the struggle for legitimacy and authority to shape the 
transformation and define which cultural resources will be considered valuable. In this 
respect, cultural capital operates as symbolic capital, thereby concealing the arbitrariness of a 
particular set of cultural resources as a source of power and domination and presenting them 
as a legitimate competence (Bourdieu, 1986, 1994). 
Taken together, our arguments suggest that the transition from hierarchical to network 
architecture affects the capital endowment of HQ and subsidiary actors, and thereby their 
relative position in the social hierarchy. Even when the transformation is not deliberately 
oriented toward the current state of power relations in the MNC, it has an effect on the 
configuration of these relations, an effect that may either be perpetuative or transformative in 
nature (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). Thus, key MNC actors stand to lose and gain during 
this transition and will engage in a political struggle over the recognition and legitimization 
of their capital endowments.   
Below, we further elaborate these arguments and discuss the influence of this 
transition on the dominant forms of capital in the MNC, the locus and content of firm-specific 
cultural capital, the relative value of firm-specific and cosmopolitan cultural capital, and the 
exchange rate of cultural capital into other forms of capital. Table 2 summarizes these 
arguments. 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
___________________________ 
Dominant forms of capital and the multinational corporation architecture  
According to Bourdieu (1985) the dominance of specific forms of capital is 
characteristic of different types of social fields. Thus, the social hierarchy in different social 
fields is anchored in one form of capital or another, or in a particular combination of forms of 
capital (Anheier et al., 1995). In hierarchical architecture cultural capital is the dominant form 
of capital, which is typical of highly segmented and highly hierarchical social fields (Anheier 
et al., 1995; Bourdieu, 1984). Specifically, cultural resources tend to be classified and rank-
ordered according to their supposedly ‘inherent’ quality and value.2 Such classifications lend 
themselves to the construction of social hierarchies and the division of the social structure 
into a segment that produces legitimized or valuable cultural resources, and another segment 
of non-legitimate or low-value cultural resources. The relationship between these two 
segments is hierarchical (Anheier et al., 1995). Therefore, cultural resources serve as the 
foundation of social hierarchies, providing a veneer of (cultural) logic and conferring 
legitimacy on status distinctions that may otherwise seem arbitrary.  
Thus, under hierarchical architecture, the MNC-as-a-field is divided into a dominant 
segment—the HQ organization—that produces and controls the legitimized cultural 
resources, and dominated segments—foreign subsidiaries—that do not possess or have access 
to legitimate cultural resources. Further, HQ actors, for whom cultural capital is a very 
important currency, are stratified according to their cultural capital endowment and engage in 
competition for social positions, rewards, and opportunities. In contrast, cultural capital is 
less important for subsidiary actors in gaining access to rewards and opportunities outside 
their subsidiary unit because their social status is likely to be primarily determined by their 
 
 
 
 
peripheral structural position in the MNC. In this regard, cultural capital acts as a 
coordination and control mechanism within the HQ organization (Magee and Galinsky, 2008) 
and as an exclusion and marginalization mechanism vis-à-vis subsidiaries. It is a coordination 
mechanism because cultural capital creates social hierarchy and social hierarchy facilitates 
order and collaborative action. It also serves a control function because individuals are 
motivated to achieve rewards and progress to higher organizational ranks that are ordered 
according to organizational performance. While subsidiary actors’ specific career ambitions 
may affect the motivational impact of cultural capital (Clark and Geppert, 2011; Morgan and 
Kristensen, 2006), in the case of asymmetrical power relations the HQ retains the ultimate 
influence over reward (see Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2016).  
In comparison, social capital is less valuable in hierarchical architecture because 
resources are mobilized mainly vertically through a potent formal hierarchy that places the 
HQ above other MNC units (e.g., Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995). In addition, inter-unit 
coordination and control occur primarily through formal and structural mechanisms 
(Martinez and Jarillo, 1989), which leads to a tighter coupling across MNC units (Orton and 
Weick, 1990) and results in the social hierarchy being closely aligned with the formal 
organizational hierarchy. Note that social capital continues to serve as an important currency 
within a particular MNC unit. For example, social relationships with influential subsidiary 
actors should help low-power actors in that subsidiary access valuable resources and pursue 
their career interests (Seibert, Kraimer, and Liden, 2001). However, in a highly segmented 
social field such as the hierarchical MNC it is more difficult to develop and maintain 
informal linkages—and transfer the associated social resources (Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn, 
1981)—from one segment to another. 
 
 
 
 
In network architecture social capital serves as the dominant form of capital, which is 
typical of complex social networks characterized by multiple segments that are differentiated 
rather than hierarchical (Anheier et al., 1995). Research suggests that resources in a network 
architecture are distributed across the MNC and are potentially accessible through both 
formal and informal means, hence the importance of developing and maintaining inter-unit 
social capital (Reiche et al., 2009; Williams and Lee, 2011). The literature also discusses the 
role of normative integration in the form of shared values and beliefs as a substitute means of 
subsidiary control at the hands of HQ (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). However, the emphasis in 
IB research on normative and social integration has overshadowed the role of power and 
politics in the network MNC (Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2014).  
Specifically, we argue that the informal, lateral and decentralized structure of a 
network organization leads to the emergence of cultural capital as an important coordination 
and control mechanism under conditions of uncertainty, complexity, and heightened political 
activity. Further, as the informal structure of a network architecture creates a fertile ground 
for power and status enhancing activities (see Whitford and Zirpoli, 2016), there is a strong 
need to curb and coordinate these activities. In this context, cultural capital and the social 
hierarchy it produces serve as important means of coordination and control. Specifically, in 
situations of high uncertainty, as in the case of spatially dispersed and loosely coupled 
interactions in network architecture, actors rely on observable characteristics to gauge quality 
and outputs, and status rankings and reputation act as a relevant and visible signalling 
mechanism (Sauder, Lynn and Podolny, 2012). In the absence of formal mechanisms of 
control and coordination, cultural capital and the associated social status help coordinate 
collective action by regulating how and when individuals should contribute to group efforts 
(Simpson et al., 2012). Further, status hierarchy exerts control by motivating individuals to 
 
 
 
 
progress to higher organizational ranks (Magee and Galinsky, 2008), according to the rules of 
the game that are embedded within it. Thus, we suggest that the decentralized and lateral 
characteristics of a network structure has unintended consequences, giving rise to a social 
hierarchy based on cultural and social capital, which are likely to be mutually reinforcing. 
Further, as both HQ and subsidiary actors share a common political arena in the network 
architecture and engage in competition for social positions, social and cultural capital are 
likely to be important not only within the HQ organization but also across the MNC.  
 
Locus and content of firm-specific cultural capital 
In hierarchical architecture, the field of power is bifurcated and authority is 
concentrated at the HQ and in the home country. As a result, HQ actors, the majority of 
whom are parent country nationals, form the dominant group in the MNC. As such, they have 
the power to legitimize their own cultural resources and delegitimize those of others through 
the management of meaning and symbolic action (Hardy, 1996). Hence, HQ actors 
monopolize the production and accumulation of symbolic capital whereas subsidiary actors 
bear what can be conceived as ‘negative symbolic capital’ (Bourdieu, 2000: 241). According 
to Ferner et al. (2012), HQ actors have greater power than subsidiaries over meaning and can 
therefore shape the cognitive and normative rules of the game by influencing the corporate 
culture, identity, and value system (Kostova, 1999). Further, HQ actors have many more 
socialization opportunities that enable them to master the rules of the game, which are often 
tacit and implicit, and to develop proficiency in playing the organizational game. Therefore, 
HQ actors can accumulate significant firm-specific cultural capital by demonstrating mastery 
of the cultural norms, values, and meaning that prevail within the MNC (Gorman, 2015).   
 
 
 
 
In addition, the large body of research on cross-national transfer of knowledge and 
practices suggests that the dominance of HQ leads to framing its knowledge as superior and 
as best practices (Ferner et al., 2012; Kostova, 1999). This places HQ actors in a privileged 
position allowing them to accumulate firm-specific cultural capital by defining what sort of 
knowledge and expertise is considered valuable within the MNC and by setting the rules 
according to which knowledge and expertise are judged and evaluated. Finally, the centrality 
of the home country culture and language also influences HQ actors’ firm-specific cultural 
capital endowment (Levy et al., 2015). In hierarchical architecture elements of corporate 
culture and national culture are intertwined and mixed with each other (Storgaard, Tienari 
and Piekkari, 2014) and consequently firm-specific cultural capital involves elements of the 
home country. Therefore, HQ actors’ adeptness in the MNC’s home country culture, values, 
and language is an important source of firm-specific cultural capital. It can also foster 
communication and trust based on common culture and language (Harvey, Reiche, and 
Moeller, 2011).    
In contrast, subsidiary actors in the hierarchical MNC have less influence over the 
rules of the organizational game and fewer opportunities to master it. They also have less 
exposure and practice at being the right kind of professional within the MNC—the meaning 
of which is often defined by powerful actors in the organization. Furthermore, subsidiary 
actors’ knowledge and expertise are often framed as ‘local’ and viewed as narrower in scope 
and applicability (Ferner et al., 2012; Harzing, 2001). Finally, subsidiary actors are often less 
proficient in the home country culture and language and therefore possess lower levels of 
communication abilities and trust (Harzing, 2001).   
The transition from hierarchical to network architecture can potentially create an 
integrated field of power where both HQ and subsidiary actors compete for domination. As a 
 
 
 
 
result, the composition of the dominant group is likely to change and include actors who are 
associated not only with HQ but also other MNC units, especially those that already have 
high levels of corporate embeddedness and strong links to HQ (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 
2008). Further, a common cultural currency is likely to emerge based on a meta-matrix that 
rank-orders the relative value of diverse cultural resources drawn from across the MNC. This 
matrix is also likely to regulate the rate at which the cultural capital of both HQ and 
subsidiary actors can be converted into symbolic capital and generate symbolic profits 
(Delmestri and Brumana, 2017). Thus, the definition of the legitimate firm-specific cultural 
capital is likely to become more inclusive, thereby diminishing the impact of the HQ and the 
home country. Even though the home country culture may continue to exert influence over 
firm-specific cultural capital, its influence is now considered as less legitimate and therefore 
often concealed and framed in more neutral terms as ‘corporate culture’ and ‘discipline’ 
(Storgaard et al., 2014). As a result of the decentralization of authority, HQ actors may see 
their power and influence eroding and therefore attempt to contest the transition and 
minimize its adverse effect on their social position.   
With the influence of the HQ and home country culture somewhat waning, the content 
of firm-specific cultural capital is likely to capture the unique administrative heritage of the 
MNC, which reflects the history, cultural inclinations, deep-rooted internal structure and 
ways of conducting business (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), and its dominant logic, which 
concerns the frames of reference and mindsets that senior MNC actors have developed over 
time as a result of interpreting and experiencing organizational situations (Prahalad and 
Bettis, 1986). These experiences bind together spatially dispersed parts of the MNC (Reiche 
et al., 2009) and establish the cognitive and normative ‘rules of the game’ that govern 
practices and interactions within the MNC. While HQ actors may still have an advantage, 
 
 
 
 
under network architecture both HQ and subsidiary actors can potentially become proficient 
in playing the organizational game and accumulate firm-specific cultural capital. This will be 
particularly the case for actors whose subsidiaries have competence-creating capabilities 
(Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005), maintain a strong business network (Andersson et al., 2007), 
or are able to influence the firm’s administrative heritage and dominant logic through other 
means.  
It is important to note that network architecture often brings together actors with  
diverse experiences. For example, Kristensen and Zeitlin’s (2001) case-study research depicts 
the administrative heritage of the MNC as embedded in the experiences of local actors with 
playing the games of different national business systems and consequently as rather diverse. 
As a result, firm-specific cultural capital in network architecture likely consists of more 
widely sourced cultural dispositions and attributes, and is more unique to the MNC and to the 
particular constellation of  external environments it operates in. Furthermore, the 
organizational game is likely to become more complex, involving a broader set of rules, 
resources, and rituals. 
In sum, under hierarchical architecture HQ actors are more likely to accumulate firm-
specific cultural capital that enables them to operate effectively within the MNC and compete 
for social positions. Subsidiary actors likely occupy a lower position in the social hierarchy 
and may experience marginalization and exclusion due to limited firm-specific cultural 
capital. In contrast, under network architecture HQ and subsidiary actors operate in an 
integrated field of power where they compete for social positions using a common cultural 
currency. However, HQ actors may still have a significant advantage due to the lasting 
impact of HQ and home country culture.  
 
 
 
 
 
The relative value of firm-specific and cosmopolitan cultural capital   
In this section, we consider the relative value of firm-specific and cosmopolitan 
cultural capital in hierarchical and network architectures. In hierarchical architecture, firm-
specific cultural capital is the dominant currency rather than cosmopolitan cultural capital. 
Further, as its content strongly reflects HQ and home country-related attributes, firm-specific 
cultural capital is an especially important currency for HQ actors. Thus, cosmopolitan 
cultural capital is relatively less important and possibly stands in direct competition with 
firm-specific cultural capital. In the case of HQ actors, individuals with high levels of both 
firm-specific and cosmopolitan cultural capital will likely face internal opposition from other 
high-status individuals who possess considerable firm-specific cultural capital but lack 
cosmopolitan cultural capital and therefore are compelled to protect their power in the 
organization from eroding (Kanter, 1995). To those latter actors, cosmopolitan cultural 
capital may threaten to diminish their own cultural capital endowment within the MNC, 
leading them to act to preserve the supremacy of their cultural capital or even enhance their 
position within the social hierarchy. They may do so by physically segregating actors with 
cosmopolitan cultural capital, for example through rearrangement of workspace or 
distribution of work assignments (Gray and Kish-Gephart, 2013), restricting access to firm-
specific cultural capital (Bjerregaard and Klitmøller, 2016), or building a coalition of actors 
that excludes those with cosmopolitan cultural capital (Whitford and Zirpoli, 2016).  
Under hierarchical architecture, subsidiary actors are peripheral participants in the 
competition for social positions and their firm-specific cultural capital, which is rather limited 
to begin with, carries little importance. Possessing cosmopolitan cultural capital is also 
unlikely to improve their standing in the social hierarchy. Without a detailed understanding of 
the normative and cognitive rules of the game, which govern practices and interactions within 
 
 
 
 
the MNC, these cosmopolitan actors may be perceived as out of touch with or even a threat to 
the company’s cultural norms, meanings, and rituals. To the extent that other actors view 
such cosmopolitans as outsiders, they will attempt to inforce the orthodoxy on firm-specific 
cultural capital or call into question the value of cosmopolitan cultural capital in order to 
protect the current social hierarchy (Gray and Kish-Gephart, 2013).  
In network architecture, both firm-specific cultural capital and cosmopolitan cultural 
capital are likely to serve as very important currencies for diverse actors in the competition 
for social positions in the MNC. In fact, the accumulation of firm-specific cultural capital by 
a wider group of actors, including subsidiary actors, enable the latter to play the corporate 
game through challenging the status quo (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008), gaining centrality 
(Andersson et al., 2007), cross-boundary networking (Williams and Lee, 2011), issue selling 
(Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2016) or resistance and strong local support (Morgan and 
Kristensen, 2006). 
Further, cosmopolitan cultural capital is likely to complement rather than compete 
with firm-specific cultural capital. Thus, actors’ cosmopolitan cultural capital should further 
their chances of attaining a higher position in the MNC’s social hierarchy. Specifically, to the 
extent that actors are proficient in the firm’s cultural norms and practices and are therefore 
less likely viewed as outsiders (Cox, 1993) others will recognize these actors’ cosmopolitan 
cultural resources, including diverse perspectives and experiences in other contexts, as more 
beneficial to achieving group-related tasks and goals (Haas, 2006). In this regard, we would 
expect relatively few restrictions in the transferability of cosmopolitan cultural capital across 
national MNC units because its value has been universalized (Igarashi and Saito, 2014). 
 
Conversion of cultural capital into other forms of capital 
 
 
 
 
In principle, the three forms of capital (economic, social, and cultural) are mutually 
reinforcing and hence one form of capital can be converted into another, contingent on the 
established ‘exchange rate’ between forms of capital, which are field-specific (Bourdieu, 
1986). Further, cultural capital can be converted into symbolic capital that affords legitimacy 
and prestige within the field. Thus, the conversion of cultural capital into social capital and 
symbolic capital is governed by the logic of the field that determines the going conversion 
rates (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Further, the three types of capital differ in liquidity 
and convertibility both within and across fields. In general, economic capital is considered 
the most liquid, most readily convertible and transferable. By comparison, the convertibility 
of social capital into economic capital is more difficult because social capital is less liquid 
and more contingent. Converting social into cultural capital may be difficult, whereas 
exchanging cultural into social capital is generally easier (Anheier et al., 1995).    
As cultural capital is the dominant form of capital in hierarchical architecture, the 
relative value of firm-specific cultural capital is high and it can be converted into social 
capital and symbolic capital under a favourable ‘exchange rate’. Thus, HQ actors who hold 
considerable firm-specific cultural capital can convert it into important social ties with 
powerful HQ actors, who can provide access to valuable resources and career opportunities 
(Granovetter, 1973; Reiche et al., 2009; Seibert et al., 2001). Additionally, they can generate 
symbolic profits in the form of prestige, honour, and reputation for the possession of 
extensive cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1986). In contrast, subsidiary actors will find it much 
harder to acquire social and symbolic capital because they lack the main currency in 
hierarchical architecture—cultural capital. In particular, social networks in hierarchical 
architecture are likely to be relatively homogeneous with regard to salient characteristics such 
as culture, nationality, and geographic location. Further, network ties among HQ actors based 
 
 
 
 
on shared cultural knowledge are likely to reinforce the social hierarchy, creating cycles of 
social closure (Coleman, 1990) and leading to the exclusion and marginalization of 
subsidiary actors who do not fit into the dominant culture. Consequently, the initial 
advantages that HQ actors obtain from their firm-specific cultural capital may further 
increase by accumulating intra-firm social capital. Network influence is therefore likely to 
reinforce the high-status position of HQ actors.   
The transition from hierarchical to network architecture can potentially transform the 
‘rules of the game’ that govern the ‘exchange rate’ between the various forms of capital 
(Delmestri and Brumana, 2017). In network architecture both cultural and social capital are 
important currencies, not only within the HQ organization but across the MNC, and are likely 
to be converted to one another with relative ease. Having the right cultural capital enables 
actors to create the social connections necessary for mobilizing relevant resources across the 
MNC network (see Lin et al., 1981). Similarly, because firm-specific cultural capital in 
network architecture is less a function of the HQ or the MNC’s home country, the path to 
acquiring firm-specific cultural capital likely involves informal socialization channels such as 
social connections. Thus, interpersonal ties can help learn the ropes and develop proficiency 
in the MNC’s unique culture, thereby fostering the accumulation of firm-specific cultural 
capital. In short, network architecture allows cultural capital and social capital to be mutually 
convertible. Further, both forms of capital can also be converted into symbolic capital and 
generate prestige and recognition across the MNC. 
Discussion 
 In this study, we offer a theoretical framework for the role of cultural resources and 
political processes in structuring the social hierarchy in the MNC under two contrasting 
organizational architectures: hierarchical and network architecture. We suggest that cultural 
 
 
 
 
capital serves as an instrument of power and status within the MNC, underlying the social 
hierarchy and influencing access to valuable resources such as jobs, rewards, and 
opportunities. Therefore, cultural capital should be viewed as a symbolic marker that is used 
instrumentally for the reproduction of power relationships and symbolic boundaries between 
employee groups in the MNC. 
Our framework further suggests that the transformation from hierarchical architecture 
towards network architecture sets in motion a high-stakes political struggle over the ‘rules of 
the game’ that order the social hierarchy in the MNC. What is at stake is nothing less than the 
capacity to determine which contrasting forms of cultural capital will become the most 
influential cards in the political game of status and power in the MNC. Thus, major 
organizational transformations are likely to create a global game of power where an 
increasing number of actors, holding different forms of capital, jockey for social positions in 
the field of power (Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005). Our approach has major implications for 
theory, practice and future research.  
 
Theoretical implications 
First, we advance the IB literature by developing a conceptual framework that draws 
attention to the political role of culture in the MNC. Our approach departs from the 
conventional perspective on organizational politics and power in IB that often emphasizes 
functional, formal, and ‘objective’ sources of power within MNCs, to the exclusion of culture 
and agency (Geppert et al., 2016). In contrast, we focus on the more profoundly buried 
structure of relations between positions in the MNC-as-a-field and uncover the underlying 
forms of capital that generate and reproduce these regularities. Thus, we highlight the crucial 
distinction between official organizational positions, with their decreed powers, and the 
 
 
 
 
cultural capital that is actually held by occupants of these positions (Emirbayer and Johnson, 
2008). While formal organizational positions confer authority and influence, many of the 
benefits accrued by their occupants are systemically generated not by the formal positions 
themselves, but by the capital endowment that actors bring with them to the post. Previous 
research has already highlighted the personal benefits generated by social capital and 
informal network ties (Lin et al., 1981), but has largely ignored the benefits generated by 
cultural capital. Specifically, formal organizational positions often serve to cloak a host of 
unearned benefits granted to privileged actors due to their symbolic capital in the form of 
legitimized cultural resources. Thus, our approach suggests that cultural capital not only 
provides access to high-status official positions, but is also partially to blame for the 
privileges and higher-than-normal returns that these positions often generate.   
Further, a growing stream of literature in IB has pointed to the sources of political 
influence of subsidiaries within the MNC, including control of resources, legitimacy in the 
eyes of other outside actors, and network embeddedness (e.g., Andersson et al., 2007; 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008; Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2016). However, we still 
know little about the conditions under which this influence may wax or wane and about the 
ensuing struggle over cultural resources this may evoke. We address these questions by 
considering the political implications of changing organizational architecture. Our analysis 
points to how actors’ locale-specific embeddedness within the MNC determines the type of 
cultural resources actors can leverage to attain a favourable position in the MNC’s social 
hierarchy, and how changes in structural configuration may grant peripheral actors the 
agency to ‘upgrade’ their capital endowments and compete for social status. 
 Second, our framework has implications for the study of culture in IB that tends to 
focus on objective-like manifestations of culture (i.e., cultural norms, values, and practices) 
 
 
 
 
and supposedly inherent cultural differences. By contrast, we view culture as a political 
resource—and a potential constraint—of both individual and collective actors. As an 
individual resource, cultural capital can be used ‘like aces in a game of cards’ (Bourdieu, 
1989: 17) in the competition for social positions, rewards, and opportunities. Furthermore, as 
the value of these trump cards is constantly at stake, individuals play the game to protect or 
upgrade the value of their capital endowment. This political dynamic goes beyond ‘normal’ 
corporate games because it impinges on the very rules that constitute the game in the first 
place. As a collective political resource, cultural capital is used instrumentally to structure 
access to valuable resources such as jobs, power, influence, and social connections. Under 
certain conditions, cultural capital can also constrain actors as in the case of cosmopolitan 
cultural capital in hierarchical architecture. As we argued, HQ actors who lack cosmopolitan 
cultural capital may act politically to preserve the supremacy of their cultural capital or even 
enhance their position within the social hierarchy relative to other HQ actors who possess 
cosmopolitan cultural capital. 
Third and finally, our approach draws attention to the transnational dynamics that 
influence the accumulation and recognition of cultural capital. Traditionally, research on 
cultural capital has been conducted in nationally-bounded settings, particularly the 
educational system (e.g., Bourdieu and Passeron, 1979, 1990; DiMaggio, 1982; Katsillis and 
Rubinson, 1990). This focus reflects the fact that cultural capital is often accumulated and 
reproduced within the national educational system and is governed by national values and 
norms. Our framework, however, underscores two contemporary developments: the 
emergence of cosmopolitanism as cultural capital and the transnationalization of cultural 
capital. In recent years, research on cosmopolitanism has suggested that highly mobile 
professionals may accumulate cosmopolitan cultural capital and then use it to monopolize 
 
 
 
 
privileges and gain power over locals (Kanter, 1995; Levy, Peiperl and Jonsen, 2016). We 
suggest, however, that while cosmopolitan cultural capital has its value in MNCs, it does not 
yet operate as a trump card, outranking all other cultural resources. Instead, we argue that the 
relative value of cosmopolitan cultural capital within the MNC depends on locally embedded 
cultural resources, and on the structural configuration of the organization.  
Cosmopolitan cultural capital may also be subject to processes of recognition, 
undervaluation, overvaluation and discontinuity when transported into a given firm because 
the relative value placed on cosmopolitan cultural capital vis-à-vis other cultural resources 
may differ across MNCs and over time. We suggest, however, that these processes occur 
primarily due to structural, strategic, and/or policy changes at the MNC level, and may reach 
beyond shifts in organizational architecture. For example, Neeley (2013) found that French 
and other non-native English-speaking employees working in a French high-tech company 
experienced a status loss after the organization instituted English as the lingua franca. 
Similarly, Birkinshaw, Crilly, Bouquet and Lee (2016) found that managers working in Asia 
experienced a substantial increase in their influence once the firm, originally headquartered in 
Amsterdam, established a second HQ in Beijing and moved towards a dual HQ model. Thus, 
once the organization undergoes significant transformations, the principles that govern the 
legitimization of cultural resources change as well, often reducing the value of cultural 
resources embedded in the HQ and the home country for ascending the social hierarchy in the 
MNC. 
 
Practical implications 
Our work also has implications for management practice. Specifically, our framework 
provides guidance for both individuals navigating their professional careers and organizations 
 
 
 
 
wishing to promote the integration of their workforce across cultural and symbolic 
boundaries. First, our theorizing suggests that firm-specific cultural capital is crucial for 
access to career opportunities and rewards. However, it also highlights that firm-specific 
cultural capital is unequally accumulated across the MNC and that some employees’ access 
to valuable cultural capital is severely restricted due to their work location, previous 
experiences, and/or nationality, especially in the hierarchical architecture. These employees 
are at a further disadvantage when it comes to accumulating valuable social connections 
within the firm. For example, research on internal promotion versus external hiring shows 
that the job performance of external hires is, at least initially, lower compared to internally 
promoted candidates although the former tend to get paid more (Bidwell, 2011). These 
findings suggest that while external hires need to be compensated for their relatively stronger 
observable human capital they also lack firm-specific resources, including firm-specific 
cultural capital, relative to internal candidates, a lack that hinders their performance. Our 
theorizing also suggests that employees who don’t have sufficient firm-specific cultural 
capital are better off looking for another job rather than waiting to accumulate firm-specific 
cultural capital in order to be promoted. Evidence indeed shows higher voluntary turnover 
rates for external compared to internal hires (Bidwell, 2011; Halaby, 1988). 
Second, our analysis suggests that changes in MNC structural configuration—whether 
in response to external market conditions or in search of more effective mechanisms of 
control and coordination—have far-reaching implications for the relative distribution of 
actors’ power and social positions within the MNC. When Samuel Palmisano took over as 
CEO of IBM in 2002, he decided to move the company away from a traditional, hierarchical 
MNC with its centre of gravity in the U.S. towards a ‘globally integrated enterprise’ with a 
network-based architecture (Kanter, 2009). The organizational transformation created 
 
 
 
 
flexible, country-based teams that would collaborate based on shared values. While strategic 
decision-making and control had previously occurred mainly at IBM’s HQ—within a circle 
of HQ-based senior executives—decisions and information increasingly flowed laterally to 
and from those with the responsibility to serve individual customers. As a result, the content 
of IBM’s firm-specific cultural capital shifted from relying on its home country culture and 
values to an amalgamation of company-specific values, cultural inclinations and ways of 
conducting business as the cognitive and normative rules of the game. The structural 
reconfiguration led foreign nationals born in emerging economies, who had successful 
careers in IBM in the U.S., to move back to their countries of origin because they perceived 
the local country operations—and their cross-unit interrelations—to be more influential than 
before. At the same time, the number of international assignments and rotations between 
IBM’s various operations increased, which further generated cross-unit connections and 
developed cosmopolitan cultural capital among its managers (Kanter, 2009). Further, actors’ 
struggle to maintain their relative capital endowments during a change in MNC structural 
configuration may slow down or in fact jeopardize such organizational transformation. MNCs 
would therefore be well advised to anticipate intra- and inter-unit political behavior, and 
broaden the set of cultural resources considered valuable in the organization before 
embarking on structural changes.  
Third, our arguments point to a persistent influence of the home country, even in the 
case of an MNC’s reconfiguration towards a network architecture. Indeed, research suggests 
that national diversity at the top of most MNCs, both at the CEO and the top management 
levels, remains low. On average, at least 85% of CEOs or top management team members of 
Fortune Global 500 companies are native to the country the corporation is headquartered in, 
which greatly limits career prospects for outsiders (Ghemawat and Vantrappen, 2015). 
 
 
 
 
Organizations wishing to promote the integration of their workforce and minimize ascriptive 
inequalities should provide opportunities for employees to accumulate firm-specific cultural 
capital by learning the informal rules of the game that govern the MNC. They should also 
make a concerted effort to define in a more inclusive way which cultural resources may be 
legitimate and valuable in the MNC. At the same time, MNCs need to be more proactive in 
their attempts to reduce the home country effect. Japanese company Rakuten is a case in 
point. With the goal to become a global company, its CEO decided to change Rakuten’s 
official corporate language from Japanese to English (Neeley, 2011). The language change 
helped Rakuten to increase cross-border communication and achieve greater global 
integration across its various foreign operations, while also elevating the cultural resources of 
non-native organizational members, especially for English native speakers. Indeed, research 
has shown that a change of language mandate partially redistributes social status across its 
organizational members according to linguistic competence (e.g., Neeley, 2013) and hence 
serves as a means of reducing the influence of nationality. 
Directions for future research 
Finally, our conceptual work points to a number of relevant questions that, we hope, 
will stimulate future research and further advance our understanding in the areas of culture, 
power and politics in MNCs. We detail these questions below.  
 
How do local actors play global political games?   Existing work on organizational 
politics in the MNC has largely focused on the organizational level, overlooking sub-
organizational and individual dynamics (Geppert et al., 2016). We suggest exploring how the 
locale-specific embeddedness of individual actors shapes the cultural resources they can 
leverage in the global corporate game and affects their bid for a higher position in the MNC’s 
 
 
 
 
social hierarchy. Integral to this research direction is a more agentic and nuanced perspective 
on corporate games and the field of power in the MNC. We have suggested that actors 
marshal their capital in competing for domination over the field of power (Emirbayer and 
Johnson, 2008). However, playing the game may require far more astute gamesmanship than 
commonly realized because the field may be fragmented, diverse, and ambiguous, and 
therefore lends itself to multiple strategies and ploys. Furthermore, what are the rules, what is 
at stake, how domination is established, and the relative potency of various weapons and 
alliances may themselves be up for grabs. Delmestri and Brumana (2017), for example, 
suggest that actors play the game in order to accumulate symbolic capital and hence be 
perceived as a legitimate and worthy player by high status actors within the field of power. 
Kristensen and Zeitlin (2001) point to multiple games and rationalities clashing within the 
MNC. Studying this multiplicity of strategies and interpretations requires a contextualized 
engagement with players and games, and calls for research that draws on ethnographic and 
qualitative case study designs. 
How do cultural and social capital work in tandem in MNCs?   International business 
research has traditionally focused on social capital and the role of informal networks to study 
collaboration as well as the access and diffusion of resources in MNCs (e.g., Kostova and 
Roth, 2003; Reiche et al., 2009), to the exclusion of cultural capital. We encourage future 
research to consider the role of culture in the formation of social relationships in the MNC 
and the resultant access to resources embedded within these relationships. Thus, we suggest 
exploring the interplay between culture and social networks, two areas that have developed 
with little cross-pollination (Weber and Dacin, 2011). Similarly, as the interrelations between 
cultural and social capital are a function of an organization’s particular structural 
configurations, future research should also consider how culture is converted into social 
 
 
 
 
capital and vice versa under different structural conditions. Further, what happens to the 
value of actors’ inter-unit social capital when a MNC re-establishes a more hierarchical 
architecture, which continues to be widespread (Andersson and Holm, 2010)? At what rate 
does cosmopolitan cultural capital decay under these conditions? It would also be interesting 
to study the extent to which the interrelations between cultural and social capital apply to 
different types of MNCs, such as emerging market MNCs or born globals. For example, how 
salient are the HQ and the home country as sources of firm-specific cultural capital in these 
MNCs? 
 
How does cultural capital operate across national borders?  Cultural capital 
increasingly operates in a transnational context and on a global scale, and is transported 
across national borders. The rules that govern its recognition and legitimization are thus 
influenced by both local and global dynamics. This also means that the relative value of firm-
specific and cosmopolitan cultural capital will depend on the specific cultural capital 
endowment of individual actors. Future research should therefore explore how the value of 
cultural capital appreciates or depreciates due to cross-border mobility or migration. For 
example, the value of formal educational credentials can severely depreciate because of lack 
of recognition in another country (Nowicka, 2014). Alternatively, transporting cultural capital 
across national borders may open up opportunities for some employees who are traditionally 
excluded due to a lack of appropriate cultural capital. Indeed, bicultural or immigrant 
employees often experience low returns on their credentials and competencies due to their 
outsider status or imperfect mastery of the home country culture, values, and language. Once 
these employees engage in transnational mobility or work in global teams, their bicultural 
experience however can become an asset (e.g., Kiesel and Haghirian, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank the three anonymous reviewers and guest editors Stewart Clegg, Mike Geppert and 
Graham Hollinshead for their very constructive feedback and suggestions.  
 
Funding 
B Sebastian Reiche gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Competitiveness (grant number: ECO2015-68272-P). 
 
Notes 
 
1 Bourdieu (1986) also identifies a third type of cultural capital: objectified cultural capital. 
This includes concrete goods that require embodied cultural capital to be appreciated and 
appropriated. 
 
2 In the cultural production world, common distinctions include ‘high culture’ and ‘low 
culture,’  ‘elite culture’ and ‘popular culture,’ and ‘good taste’ and ‘vulgar taste’ (Bourdieu, 
1984). 
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Table 1. Hierarchical and network multinational corporation architectures 
Characteristic Hierarchical architecture Network architecture 
Distribution of authority  Managerial capabilities, resources and 
decision-making are concentrated at HQ 
 Managerial capabilities, resources and 
decision-making are dispersed throughout the 
MNC 
Range of resource 
mobilization 
 Vertical flows of people, products and 
knowledge 
 Lateral and vertical flows of people, products 
and knowledge 
Coordination and control 
mechanisms 
 Primarily structural and formal mechanisms; 
focus on calculative means 
 Relatively more informal and subtle 
mechanisms; focus on normative integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Cultural capital and multinational corporation architecture 
Characteristic Hierarchical architecture Network architecture 
Dominant group HQ actors HQ and subsidiary actors 
Dominant form(s) of 
capital 
 Cultural capital  
 Informal social hierarchy in MNC is reflected in 
formal organizational hierarchy (both are 
mutually constitutive) 
 Cultural capital acts as coordination and control 
mechanism within HQ 
 Social and cultural capital  
 Lateral and decentralized structure creates need 
for informal mechanisms of coordination and 
control 
 Cultural capital acts as coordination and control 
mechanism across the MNC  
Locus and content of 
firm-specific cultural 
capital 
 Firm-specific cultural capital resides at HQ and 
reflects culture of HQ actors 
 Firm-specific cultural capital reflects culture of 
home country 
 Firm-specific cultural capital resides at level of 
MNC and reflects culture of diverse MNC actors 
 Firm-specific cultural capital reflects 
administrative heritage and organizational 
culture/identity of MNC  
Relative value of 
firm-specific and 
cosmopolitan cultural 
capital  
 Firm-specific cultural capital is important for 
HQ actors but not for subsidiary actors 
 Cosmopolitan cultural capital carries little 
importance 
 Firm-specific cultural capital is important across 
the MNC 
 Cosmopolitan cultural capital carries importance 
Conversion of cultural 
capital 
 Cultural capital can be converted to social 
capital within the HQ 
 Cultural and social capital are mutually 
convertible 
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